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IS A LOGGING ROAD’S COLLECTED 
RUNOFF EXEMPT FROM NPDES 
PERMITTING?—RETHINKING THE EPA’S 
“SILVICULTURAL RULE” 
Lawrence Lee Budner* 
Abstract: The EPA’s various iterations of the Silvicultural Rule have suc-
ceeded in circumventing the Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System permitting requirements for decades. Al-
though the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Northwest Environmental 
Defense Center v. Brown significantly narrows the applicability of the Rule, 
the decision has left the status of the Silvicultural Rule unclear. Moreover, 
EPA’s latest regulations regarding stormwater discharges—which pur-
portedly aim to provide clarity—only muddy the water. In the Supreme 
Court’s coming consideration of the validity of the Silvicultural Rule, it 
should take the opportunity to explicitly invalidate the Rule as inconsis-
tent with the CWA. Moreover, in its decision, the Court should not be in-
fluenced by the EPA’s latest regulations because they do not alter the sub-
stance of the Silvicultural Rule and fail to conform to the requirements of 
the CWA. 
Introduction 
 Forestland is the site of a theatre of conflicting human activities, 
some beneficial to forest ecosystems and others threatening.1 Individu-
als use our nation’s forests recreationally and for aesthetic enjoyment.2 
Public entities—such as the U. S. Forest Service (USFS)—engage in a 
number of activities purportedly aimed at sustaining the health and 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2012–2013. 
1 See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and 
Foresight, 8 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 111, 120 (1998) (arguing that forest management 
must balance a number of competing and conflicting interests); Thomas Lundmark, Meth-
ods of Forest Law-Making, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 783, 783–84 (1995) (“Forestland pro-
vides timber for construction and paper, a habitat for wildlife, and recreation areas and 
aesthetic value for visitors. Each of these uses is in potential conflict with the other . . . .”). 
2 Lundmark, supra note 1, at 783. 
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diversity of our national forests.3 These silvicultural activities include 
logging, supporting recreational uses, enhancing scenic beauty, improv-
ing wildlife habitat, and protecting forest ecosystem.4 Private entities, 
sometimes contracting with the USFS, engage in logging and related 
construction necessary to complete these projects.5 
 The environmental impact of deforestation and related silvicul-
tural activities upon forests themselves is obvious—indeed the disap-
pearance and destruction of forestland is one of the most powerful and 
prevalent symbols of environmental decline.6 These activities however, 
have drastic environmental effects that go beyond the borders of the 
forests themselves.7 Only recently have scientists begun to understand 
the effects of deforestation on global climate change. Recent studies 
estimate that deforestation releases roughly 5.9 gigatons of carbon di-
oxide per year, about seventeen to twenty-five percent of all annual 
greenhouse gas emissions.8 
 Another major consequence of silvicultural activities is the pollu-
tion of fresh water sources including wetlands, streams, lakes, and 
groundwater.9 In addition to deforestation, forest road development, 
timber harvesting activities, mechanical site preparation, pesticide ap-
plication, and prescribed burning all pose significant threats to fresh 
                                                                                                                      
3 Strategic Planning and Resource Assessment, U.S. Forest Service, http://www.fs.fed.us/ 
plan/ (last modified Dec. 5, 2008). 
4 U.S. Forest Serv., Water Quality and Wetlands 3, available at http://nrs.fs.fed. 
us/fmg/nfmg/docs/mn/WaterQ.pdf. 
5 See Eric E. Huber, Environmental Litigation and the Healthy Forests Initiative, 29 Vt. L. 
Rev. 797, 800 (2005). 
6 See Loss of U.S. Forest Land, Soc’y of Am. Foresters, 1–2 (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www. 
eforester.org/fp/documents/Loss_of_forest_land.pdf. U.S. Forest land comprises roughly 
747 million acres, only two-thirds of what it was four centuries ago. Id.; Forest Resources of the 
United States, Nat’l Atlas of the United States, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/ 
biology/a_forest.html (last modified Oct. 22, 2012). 
7 U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4 (noting the effects on freshwater sources); Ross W. 
Gorte & Pervaze v. Sheikh, Cong. Research Serv., R41144, Deforestation and Cli-
mate Change 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41144.pdf (not-
ing the effects on climate change). 
8 Gorte & Sheikh, supra note 7, at 1; see Andrew W. Mitchell et al., Global Canopy 
Programme, Forests First in the Fight Against Climate Change 5 (2d ed. 2008) (find-
ing that deforestation accounts for twenty percent of global carbon emissions), available at 
http://www.globalcanopy.org/sites/default/files/Forests%20Now%20Report_Nov%2008_ 
0.pdf. 
9 U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4; see also Samuel P. Hays, The New Environmental Forest, 
59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 517, 526 (1988) (noting that “timber cutting expose[s] soils to erosion 
and create[s] undesirable sedimentation in irrigation and urban water supplies”). 
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water sources.10 According to the USFS, however, the construction and 
maintenance of logging roads has the greatest potential to impact water 
quality and wetlands of any silvicultural activity.11 These forest manage-
ment activities generate a variety of water pollutants including sediment, 
pesticides, nutrients, fuels and lubricants, organic matter, and thermal 
impacts.12 
 Private timber companies often contract with federal and state for-
est departments to gain access to logging sites and build logging 
roads.13 The companies then typically construct the roads such that 
water runs off of the road into adjacent ditches.14 As was the case in 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, the companies design 
logging roads with “systems of ditches, culverts, and channels that col-
lect and convey stormwater runoff.”15 Eventually, these drainage sys-
tems discharge stormwater into channels, which in turn convey the 
runoff into streams, and subsequently into rivers.16 Stormwater con-
tains a high amount of sediment, mostly consisting of gravel, rocks, and 
woodchips, due in part to the timber hauling that occurs on logging 
roads.17 Once this stormwater reaches rivers and streams, it pollutes 
                                                                                                                      
10 U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4, at 4; see also Dan Binkley & Thomas C. Brown, Forest 
Practices as Nonpoint Sources of Pollution in North America, 29 J. Am. Resources Ass’n 729, 729 
(1993), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/value/docs/forest_practices_nonpoint_pol- 
lution.pdf (“Forest management practices, such as road construction, harvesting, and regen-
eration may substantially alter the quality of water draining from forested watersheds.”). 
11 U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4, at 4. The USFS attributes this impact to the “con-
centration of activity, the extent of area affected, the amount of disturbed and exposed 
soil, and the relative permanence of a forest road.” Id. 
12 Id.; Binkley & Brown, supra note 10 (“[F]orest practices have resulted in large or 
unacceptable changes in stream temperature and concentrations of dissolved oxygen, 
nitrate-N, and suspended sediments.”). 
13 See Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011); Huber, supra 
note 5. 
14 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1067. 
15 Id. These stormwater collection systems transport and channel, rather than gener-
ate, pollutants. See David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, 34 Colum. J. 
Envtl. L. 267, 313 (2009). 
16 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1067. 
17 Id. As the Brown court describes, “[l]ogging trucks passing over the roads grind up the 
gravel and dirt on the surface of the road. Small rocks, sand, and dirt are then washed into 
the collection system and discharged directly into the streams and rivers.” Id.; see Thomas C. 
Brown & Dan Binkley, U.S. Forest Serv. General Technical Report RM-248, Effects 
of Management on Water Quality in North American Forests 1, 14 (1994), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/value/docs/management_effects_forest_water_quality.pdf. 
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sources of freshwater and threatens the wellbeing of ecological com-
munities.18 
 The question of whether and to what extent the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) can be used to regulate discharges from silvicultural activities is 
yet to be resolved.19 This Note discusses federal regulation of dis-
charges from silvicultural activities. Part I provides background to the 
CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permitting program and the history of the various iterations of the Sil-
vicultural Rule (the “Silvicultural Rule” or the “Rule”).20 Part II dis-
cusses the relevant case law regarding the Silvicultural Rule, including 
the Chevron doctrine, the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Brown, which 
significantly narrowed the Rule promulgated in 2011 (the “2011 Silvi-
cultural Rule”), and the Supreme Court’s recent consideration of the 
Silvicultural Rule in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.21 
Part III examines the validity of the Silvicultural Rule, the Brown deci-
sion’s effect on the Rule, and the strength of states’ brief in support of 
reversing Brown.22 Additionally, Part III assesses EPA’s newest regula-
tions (“2012 clarification”) affecting silvicultural discharges and con-
cludes the regulations fail to affect the substance of the Silvicultural 
                                                                                                                     
Rule.23 
 This Note concludes that the Silvicultural Rule—even after the 
2012 clarification—is inconsistent with the CWA and dilutes the force 
of NPDES permitting with respect to silvicultural discharges.24 More-
over, this Note argues that although the Ninth Circuit may have left the 
future of the Silvicultural Rule somewhat ambiguous, its jurisprudence 
will lead to accountability on behalf of entities engaged in forest man-
agement activities and put an end to decades of evading the NPDES 
requirements.25 Ultimately, in this term, the Supreme Court should 
consider the substance and validity of the 2011 Silvicultural Rule.26 In 
 
18 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1067. For example, stormwater affects fish “by smothering 
eggs, reducing oxygen levels, interfering with feeding, and burying insects that provide 
food.” Id. 
19 See Andrew King, Comment, Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown: De-
livering the Back Cuts? The Ninth Circuit Leaves the Silvicultural Rule in the Balance, 24 Tul. 
Envtl. L.J. 159, 171 (2010) (noting that “[f]uture decisions are needed to clarify the pre-
carious state of the Silvicultural Rule”). 
20 See infra notes 28–80 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 80–153 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 154–269 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 193–199 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 154–269 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 230–269 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 193–199 and accompanying text. 
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doing so, the Court should recognize that the 2012 clarification fails to 
change the substance of the Rule and consequently should take the 
opportunity to explicitly invalidate the 2011 Silvicultural Rule, thereby 
putting an end to decades of NPDES permitting evasion.27 
I. Legislative and Regulatory Background 
 
th
     
A. The Clean Water Act and NPDES 
 In 1948, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (FWPCA) to establish a national framework governing the regula-
tion of water pollution.28 Almost thirty years later, in 1977, Congress 
enacted significant amendments to the FWPCA and renamed it the 
Clean Water Act.29 The objective of the CWA is to “restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s wa-
ters” and to eliminate the discharge of pollutants.30 To achieve these 
goals, the CWA established technology-based effluent limitations31 and
au orizes the EPA to implement regulations consistent with the Act.32 
 Subject to limited exceptions, section 301(a) of the CWA pro-
vides that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be 
unlawful.”33 As the legislative history illustrates, Congress intended 
this legislation to have teeth.34 According to a Senate Report, section 
301 “clearly establishes that the discharge of pollutants is unlawful.”35 
Instead of broad directives for administrators to follow, the CWA sets 
                                                                                                                 
27 See infra notes 193–269 and accompanying text. 
28 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357 (2006)). 
29 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 
33 U Note,“Pigs Will Fly”: Protecting the Los 
Ang
S.C. § 1251(a); see Harris, supra note 29. 
see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1371 (D.C. 
Cir.
. . any addition of any pollut-
ant 
3668, 3709. Unlike its 
predecessor program, which allowed for the discharge of pollutants at certain levels, sec-
tion
.S.C. §§ 1251–1357 (2006)); see Susan Harris, 
eles River by Declaring Navigability, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 185, 196 (2012). 
30 33 U.
31 33 U.S.C. § 1311; 
 1977). 
32 33 U.S.C. § 1361. 
33 Id. § 1311(a). The CWA defines the “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source [or] . 
to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a 
vessel or floating craft.” Id. § 1362(12) (emphasis added). 
34 See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 42 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
 301 of the CWA establishes “no one has the right to pollute.” Id. 
35 Id. 
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up a regime of precise standards and clear directives on how to pro-
tect freshwater sources.36 
 NPDES, embodied in section 402 of the CWA, is the CWA’s pri-
mary means of enforcing the Act’s effluent limitations.37 NPDES is a 
simple and effective instrument.38 Additionally, NPDES acts as the pri-
mary exception to section 301’s prohibition on the discharge of pollut-
ants into water sources.39 Through NPDES, the CWA authorizes indi-
     
vidual pollution discharges, but only if they comply with the specific 
requirements provided by section 402.40 
 NPDES permits apply only to “point sources” of pollution.41 The 
CWA defines a “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete con-
veyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, 
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated 
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.”42 The CWA, however, excludes 
agricultural stormwater discharges from the definition of “point 
source.”43 The definition seeks to identify those sources well-suited for 
control and regulation.44 Moreover, as the legislative history suggests, 
the term should be interpreted expansively so as to include a wide array 
of instrumentalities.45 Although the CWA leaves “nonpoint source” un-
                                                                                                                 
36 Costle, 568 F.2d at 1375 (quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 38,805 (1971) (statement of Sen. 
Jen
m is rational 
and
ents.”). 
 the NPDES permit to be the only means by which a discharger 
from
-
mit
ecause the definition of “discharge of a pollutant” is 
limi
 1362(14) (2006). 
harges resulting from point sources other than pipelines or similar 
con
nings Randolph)). 
37 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006); Jeffery M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits 
Under the Clean Water Act, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 409, 410 (2007). 
38 See Drelich, supra note 15, at 329 (“The [CWA’s] NPDES permit progra
 well organized, and its reporting rules promote compliance and enforcement.”); 
Gaba, supra note 37, at 414 (“The NPDES structure established a relatively simple and 
effective mechanism for identifying and enforcing pollution requirem
39 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342; Costle, 568 F.2d at 1374 (“[T]he legislative history makes clear 
that Congress intended
 a point source may escape the total prohibition of § 301(a).”). 
40 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The CWA provides EPA with the ability to issue NPDES per
s. Id. § 1342(a)(2). 
41 Id. §§ 1342, 1362(12), (14). B
ted only to “point sources,” NPDES only applies to point sources. Id. § 1362(12). 
42 Id. § 1362(14) (emphasis added). 
43 33 U.S.C. §
44 Drelich, supra note 15, at 312 (“[T]he meaning of the definition can be understood 
as singling out those candidates suitable for control-at-the-source.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
45 S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 51 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3760 (“[EPA] 
should not ignore disc
duits. . . . There are many other forms of periodic, though frequent, discharges of pol-
lutants into the water through point sources such as barges, vessels, feedlots, trucks and 
other conveyances.”). 
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defined, the legislative history indicates the term refers to pollution 
generated from diffuse or unidentifiable sources.46 Thus, the discharge 
of any pollutant from a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” 
without a
ing to the 
 NPDES permit is unlawful under the CWA.47 
B. The Promulgation and History of the Silvicultural Rule 
 In 1973, the EPA promulgated a series of regulations exempting 
several kinds of discharges from NPDES.48 Purportedly, the EPA de-
rived its authority to make these exemptions from section 402 of the 
CWA, which states that the EPA may issue a permit for the discharge of 
any pollutant despite section 301’s general prohibition on pollution 
discharges.49 These regulations included an exemption for discharges 
from silvicultural activities, referred to as the Silvicultural Rule.50 The 
EPA promulgated these exemptions in an effort to conserve its re-
sources for more significant sources of pollution.51 Accord
EPA, it would become infeasible to adequately enforce section 402 
without these exemptions for smaller sources of pollution.52 
 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the Silvicultural Rule as 
                                                                                                                      
46 Id. at 98–99, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3759 (“[A] non-point source of pollution is one 
that does not confine its pollution discharge to one fairly specific outlet, such as a sewer 
themselves to control by 
plac
. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. 
Co.,
ing Agriculture and Sil-
vicu
 activities that had been 
iden
st numbers of agricultural discharge application forms.”); see Costle, 568 F.2d 
at 1
elines Regarding Agriculture and Sil-
vicu
pipe, a drainage ditch or a conduit . . . .”) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole); see Gaba, supra 
note 37, at 421 (stating that nonpoint sources do “not lend 
ement of numerical limits on the discharge of pollutants”). 
47 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1362(12), (14); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1070. (“The com-
bined effect of §§ 301(a) and 402 is that ‘[t]he CWA prohibits the discharge or any pollut-
ant from a point source into navigable waters of the United States without an NPDES per-
mit.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting N
 325 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
48 40 C.F.R. § 125.4(j) (1975); see Form and Guidelines Regard
ltural Activities, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,000, 18,000–04 ( July 5, 1973). 
49 Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006); Costle, 568 F.2d at 1372. 
50 40 C.F.R. § 125.4(j). According to the regulation, the following did not require NPDES 
permits: “[d]ischarges of pollutants from agricultural and silvicultural activities, including 
irrigation return flow and runoff from orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, rangelands, and 
forest lands.” Id. (emphasis added). The exclusion provided by § 125.4, however, did not 
apply to discharges originating from any agricultural or silvicultural
tified as a significant contributor of pollution. Id. § 125.4(j)(5). 
51 Form and Guidelines Regarding Agriculture and Silvicultural Activities, 38 Fed. Reg. 
at 18,000 (“The basis for the exclusions is that the pollution problems caused by the ex-
cluded categories of point sources are minor in relation to the administrative problem of 
processing va
372–73. 
52 See Costle, 568 F.2d at 1372–73; Form and Guid
ltural Activities, 38 Fed. Reg. at 18,000. 
204 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:197 
unlawful under the FWPCA.53 The central issue in Train, which the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia later re-
solved in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, was whether the EPA 
could promulgate regulations exempting discharges falling within the 
definition of point source from the NPDES permitting process.54 In 
defense of these regulations, the EPA contended that these discharges 
were ill-suited for inclusion in the permit program because they resem-
bled nonpoint sources, and were administratively infeasible.55 The EPA 
argued the CWA and its legislative history recognized this infeasibility, 
d 
ction 208 of the FWPCA, whether or 
not the rainfall happens to collect before flowing into navigable wa-
ters.”60 The EPA concluded that because most silvicultural discharges 
                    
an gave the EPA power to promulgate rules to alleviate the adminis-
trative burden.56 Rejecting these arguments, the court held that the 
CWA prevents the EPA from exempting point source discharges from 
the NPDES program.57 
 Shortly after the Train decision, and concurrently with its appeal, 
the EPA promulgated revised regulations regarding the Silvicultural 
Rule.58 In December 1975, the EPA solicited public comment on a pro-
posed system for separate agricultural and silvicultural storm sewers.59 
During this time, the EPA stated its position: “[M]ost rainfall runoff is 
more properly regulated under se
                                                                                                  
lines Regarding Agriculture and Sil-
vicu
ng 
NPD f small sources.”). 
d discharges from agricultural and silvicultural activities as problems to be dealt 
with
n, 396 F. Supp. at 1402. 
 124.85 (1976); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System and 
State Program Elements Necessary for Participation, 41 Fed. Reg. 6281, 6283 (Feb. 12, 
1976). 
59 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,932, 56,935 (Dec. 
5, 1975). 
60 Id. at 56,932. 
53 396 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (D.D.C. 1975). 
54 Id. at 1396 (“In the court’s view the only issue to be determined is whether FWPCA 
allows the Administrator the latitude to exempt entire classes of point sources from the 
NPDES permit requirements.”); see Costle, 568 F.2d at 1383 (holding that the EPA cannot 
exempt entire classes of point sources from NPDES permit requirements). 
55 Train, 396 F. Supp. at 1395; see Form and Guide
ltural Activities, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,000, 18,000 ( July 5, 1973); Gaba, supra note 37, at 
420–21 (“First, EPA was concerned with the difficulty of developing ‘end-of-pipe’ effluent 
limitations for these types of discharges [because they] . . . resembled non-point source 
discharges . . . . Second, EPA was concerned about the administrative difficulties of issui
ES permits to large numbers o
56 Form and Guidelines Regarding Agriculture and Silvicultural Activities, 38 Fed. Reg. 
at 18,000 (“In addition, the Act and the legislative history indicate clearly that Congress 
regarde
 primarily through the exercise of authorities concerning non-point sources . . . .”). 
57 Trai
58 See 40 C.F.R. §
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were nonpoint in nature, silvicultural discharges should not be covered 
by the NPDES permit program.61 
 Two months later the EPA proposed a revised Silvicultural Rule.62 
In this iteration, the EPA slightly narrowed the silvicultural exception to 
better conform to the Train decision, by qualifying the sources listed 
with language from the CWA’s definition of point source.63 During the 
notice and comment period for the revised iteration, the EPA again 
emphasized that most water pollution related to silvicultural activities is 
nonpoint in nature.64 According to the EPA, only pollution generated 
from the silvicultural activities enumerated in the regulations are point 
sources subject to the NPDES permit program.65 All other sources of 
lvic
etermined whether it 
nc
                                                                                                                     
si ultural discharge do not “result [from] controlled water use by a 
person” and thus are nonpoint.66 
 In November 1977, after the EPA promulgated its final revised Sil-
vicultural Rule, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s invalidation 
of the original Silvicultural Rule in Costle.67 The D.C. Circuit recognized 
that even though the EPA has the authority to define point sources, the 
EPA lacks the authority to exempt classes of point sources from the 
NPDES permit system.68 The court, however, neither reviewed the re-
vised Silvicultural Rule proposed in 1976 nor d
fu tioned as a categorical, and therefore statutorily inconsistent, ex-
emption from the definition of a point source.69 
 
on System and State Program Elements Necessary for Participation, 41 Fed. Reg. 
at 6
 Program Elements Nec-
essar
, prescribed burning, pesticide and fire control, and harvesting operations” did not. 
Id. 
y to exempt categories of point sources from the 
perm ] 402.”). 
61 Id. 
62 40 C.F.R. § 124.85 (“The term ‘silvicultural point source’ means any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance related to rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting or 
log storage facilities which are operated in connection with silvicultural activities and from 
which pollutants are discharged into navigable waters.”); National Pollutant Discharge 
Eliminati
281. 
63 See 40 C.F.R. § 124.85; King, Delivering the Back Cuts, supra note 19, at 163. 
64 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System and State
y for Participation, 41 Fed. Reg. 6281, 6282 (Feb. 12, 1976). 
65 Id. The EPA offered no basis for why “rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting and 
log storage facilities[]” carry runoff through a “discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance” but “nursery operations, site preparation, reforestation in all stages of growth, thin-
ning
66 Id. 
67 568 F.2d at 1377. 
68 Id. (“The wording of the statute, legislative history, and precedents are clear: the 
EPA Administrator does not have authorit
it requirements of [section
69 See Costle, 568 F.2d 1369. 
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 The third version of the Silvicultural Rule, issued in 2011, changes 
little from the revised rule.70 The 2011 version provides “‘[s]ilvicultural 
point source’ means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance 
related to rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage fa-
cilities which are operated in connection with silvicultural activities and 
from which pollutants are discharged into waters of the United 
States.”71 The Rule also enumerates silvicultural activities which, accord-
ing to the EPA, do  and are thus not 
bj
int source discharges of storm-
ate
tizes and regulates the most significant sources of stormwater pollu-
                                                                                
 not render point source discharges
su ect to NPDES.72 
C. The 1987 Stormwater Amendments 
 Congress amended the CWA with the Water Quality Act of 1987.73 
Among many other changes, the 1987 amendments added new provi-
sions regarding stormwater discharges (“Stormwater Amendments”).74 
Before these Stormwater Amendments, the CWA required the EPA to 
establish a permitting system for all po
w r.75 The EPA, however, failed to implement such a system, in part 
due to the immense number of stormwater sources covered within the 
definition of point source discharge.76 
 The Stormwater Amendments sought to lessen this administrative 
burden by adopting a phased and tiered approach to NPDES permit-
ting of stormwater discharges.77 Under section 402(p), the EPA priori-
                                      
. § 122.27(b)(1). 
987, Pub. L. No 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.
g to another Senator, “[r]equiring a permit for these kinds of stormwater runoff 
con
of these administrative difficulties, as well as the unique character of 
stor
70 Compare 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2011), with 40 C.F.R. § 124.85 (1976). 
71 40 C.F.R
72 Id. The final rule also enumerated silvicultural activities which the EPA considered 
nonpoint. Id. 
73 Water Quality Act of 1
C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)). 
74 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p). 
75 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1082. 
76 See id. The legislative history reflects Congress’s understanding of the difficulty of 
requiring such a large number of NPDES permits: “[U]nder Existing law, the [EPA] must 
require [NPDES] permits for anyone who has stormwater runoff on their property. What 
we are talking about [are] potentially thousands of permits . . . for runoff that poses no 
environmental threat[.]” 131 Cong. Rec. 19,846, 19,850 (1985) (alteration in original). 
Accordin
veyance systems would be an administrative nightmare.” 131 Cong. Rec. 15616, 15657 
(1985). 
77 Andrew King, Comment, Leading the EPA to Stormwater: The Long Road to Construction 
Stormwater Regulation and the Role of Numeric Effluent Limitations, 24 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 335, 344 
(2011) (“In recognition 
mwater discharges, Congress passed the 1987 Stormwater Amendments to the CWA.”); 
see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p). 
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tion—including discharges associated with industrial activities—under 
“Phase I” regulations.78 “Phase II” regulations cover all other sources of 
stormwater discharge.79 This phased and tiered system of regulation of 
sources ensures that major contributors of stormwater pollution will be 
addresse .80 
II. R ts 
total emission from the plant.”85 The Chevron Court sought to resolve 
                                                                                                                     
d first so as to alleviate the EPA’s administrative burden
elevant Case Law and Recent Developmen
A. Chevron Deference and Agency Interpretations 
 In the landmark case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., the Supreme Court established the standard for judicial 
review of an agency’s interpretation of the statute it implements.81 
Therefore, any challenge to the validity of the Silvicultural Rule neces-
sarily implicates the Chevron doctrine.82 In Chevron, the Supreme Court 
evaluated the EPA’s construction of the Clean Air Act’s (CAA) statutory 
term “stationary source.”83 Under the EPA’s interpretation of this term, 
states develop a plantwide definition of stationary source.84 Consistent 
with this plantwide definition, a “plant that contains several pollution-
emitting devices may install or modify one piece of equipment without 
meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will not increase the 
 
e NPDES program . . . .” Id.; see 
Nat gulations for Storm Water 
Disc
ower in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 455 (1989) (stating that Chevron 
“ann ial vacillation” between interpretive models of agency defer-
ence
67 U.S. at 842–43. 
s on a pipe-by-pipe, smokestack-by-smokestack basis. Instead, the agency sets a 
 
78 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B); King, supra note 77. EPA regulations addressing “indus-
trial activities” provide that “[s]torm water discharge associated with industrial activity 
means the discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm 
water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage 
areas at an industrial plant.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2011). Referencing the 2011 Silvi-
cultural Rule, the regulations further provide that “[industrial activity] does not include 
discharges from facilities or activities excluded from th
ional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Re
harges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 48,011 (Nov. 16, 1990). 
79 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(5) (2006); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1082. 
80 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1082; King, supra note 77. 
81 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Bal-
ance of P
ounced the end of judic
). 
82 See 4
83 Id. at 840. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. The practice of treating multiple pollution emitting devices within the same unit 
as one industrial grouping is often referred to as the “bubble concept.” Jack L. Landau, 
Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines to Burst EPA’s Bubble Concept, 15 Envtl. 
L. 285, 286–87. (1985) (“According to this concept, the agency does not limit pollution 
emission
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whether EPA’s rule permitting states to treat multiple pollution-
emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as one unit was a 
as
uate 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its implementing act.92 
B. Northw  the Ninth 
re onable construction of the term stationary source.86 
 In its resolution of this narrow regulatory issue, the Supreme 
Court articulated the standard of review for an agency’s interpretation 
of the statute it implements.87 The two-step analysis first asks whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.88 If the 
statute is clear and unambiguous, then a court must adhere to Con-
gress’s express intent.89 If the statute is silent or ambiguous, step two of 
the Chevron analysis asks whether the agency based its interpretation on 
a permissible construction of the statute.90 A court will defer to all rea-
sonable agency interpretations.91 The goal of the Chevron doctrine is to 
ensure that courts follow the intent of Congress while giving adeq
est Environmental Defense Center v. Brown and
Circuit’s Construction of the 2011 Silvicultural Rule 
 In Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit considered a number of issues regarding the 
2011 iteration of the Silvicultural Rule (“2011 Silvicultural Rule” or 
“Rule”).93 The court considered the Rule’s compatibility with the lan-
guage of the Clean Water Act (CWA), the effect of the 1987 Stormwater 
Amendments of the CWA, and the extent to which the CWA governs 
natural discharges of stormwater.94 Most significantly, the court nar-
rowly held that the “Silvicultural Rule does not exempt from the defini-
                                                                                                                      
maximum emission limit for an entire plant . . . as if they existed under a large bubble 
. . . .”). 
86 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
87 Id. at 842–43. 
88 Id. at 842. Later in United States v. Mead Corp., the Court held that the heightened 
deference provided by Chevron is only applicable where the agency interpretation is em-
bodied in a rule or some other procedure carrying the “force of law.” 533 U.S. 218, 237 
(2001). 
89 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
90 Id. at 843. 
91 See id. 
92 Id. at 843–44; Farina, supra note 81, at 456 (“Courts must defer . . . in order to re-
spect the legislature’s decision to entrust regulatory responsibility to agencies, and to en-
sure that the policy choices inherent in interpreting regulatory statutes are made by per-
sons answerable to the political branches rather than by unelected judges.”). 
93 640 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) (considering the validity of the 2011 iteration of 
the Silvicultural Rule). 
94 Id. at 1069–71, 1080, 1081–85. 
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tion of point source discharge under § 512(14) stormwater runoff from 
logging roads that is collected and channeled in a system of ditches, 
discharged into 
renders the pollutant.105 That is, the 2011 Silvicultural Rule provides 
                                                                                                                     
culverts, and conduits before being discharged into streams and riv-
ers.”95 The decision, however, refrained from explicitly invalidating the 
Silvicultural Rule.96 
 In Brown, the Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC), 
an Oregon-based non-profit organization,97 brought an action against 
the Oregon State Forester, members of the Oregon Board of Forestry, 
and various timber companies.98 NEDC alleged that the defendants 
collectively violated the CWA by discharging stormwater without a 
NPDES permit.99 The runoff in dispute was dischargeby a system of 
channels that received stormwater from logging roads located within 
Oregon’s Tillamook State Forest.100 More specifically, the discharges in 
question consisted of “runoff that flow[ed] from logging roads into sys-
tems of ditches, culverts, and channels and [was] then 
forest streams and rivers.”101 NEDC argued that these discharges consti-
tuted point source discharges and therefore required National Pollut-
ant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits.102 
 In Brown, the Ninth Circuit noted that the CWA and the 2011 Sil-
vicultural Rule provided contradictory treatments of the term point 
source.103 The CWA distinguishes between point sources and nonpoint 
sources depending on whether the polluter channels and controls the 
substance through a “discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance.”104 In contrast, the 2011 Silvicultural Rule categorically distin-
guishes between two types of discharges depending on the activity that 
 
 Silvicultural Rule and may have “left a slim window for Silvicultural Rule juris-
dict
n working to protect the environment and natural resources of the 
Paci
.3d at 1066. 
 1067. 
011); see Brown, 640 F.3d at 1078. 
95 Id. at 1080. 
96 See King, supra note 19, at 169, 171 (noting that the Brown court did not entirely in-
validate the
ion”). 
97 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1066; Northwest Environmental. Defense Center: Purpose and History, 
Lewis & Clark L. Sch., http://law.lclark.edu/centers/northwest_environmental_defense_ 
center/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (“NEDC was established by a group of professors, law stu-
dents and attorney alumni at Lewis and Clark Law School in 1969. NEDC is an independent, 
non-profit organizatio
fic Northwest.”). 
98 Brown, 640 F
99 Id. at
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1078. 
104 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1078. 
105 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2
210 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:197 
that “silvicultural point source” discharges are those relating to rock 
crushing, log sorting, and the like.106 The effect of this distinction is 
that the Silvicultural Rule treats certain discharges as nonpoint sources, 
ven
iscernible, 
nf
pollutant or polluting activity, it was inconsistent with the CWA’s empha-
                                                   
e  if they are channeled or controlled by “discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance[s].”107 
 Instead of identifying stormwater as point or nonpoint dependant 
on the activity with which it was associated, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
collection and conveyance through a “discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance” was determinative of point sources.108 For example, 
according to the court, “[s]tormwater that is not collected or channeled 
and then discharged, but rather runs off and dissipates in a natural and 
unimpeded manner, is not a discharge from a point source as defined 
by § 502(14).”109 On the other hand, “when stormwater runoff is col-
lected in a system of ditches, culverts, and channels and is then dis-
charged into a stream or river, there is a ‘discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance’ of pollutants, and there is therefore a discharge from 
a point source.”110 This distinction elucidates the court’s disagreement 
with the 2011 Silvicultural Rule’s categorical approach: runoff is neither 
inherently point source pollution nor inherently nonpoint pollution.111 
Rather, the classification of runoff as point or nonpoint depends upon 
whether it is collected, channeled or discharged through a “d
co ined and discrete conveyance,” or whether the runoff is allowed to 
disperse and dissipate naturally in an unimpeded manner.112 
 Just as the D.C. Circuit held in Costle, the Ninth Circuit found that, 
to the extent the 2011 Silvicultural Rule focused on the character of the 
                                                                   
0 F.3d at 1080; 40 C.F.R. § 122.27. 
. Id. That is, the CWA’s definition of point 
sou ined and discrete conveyance” encompassed the pesticide 
spra
stor
106 40 C.F.R. § 122.27. 
107 See Brown, 64
108 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1079. 
109 Id. at 1070. 
110 Id. at 1070–71. The court’s discussion of a previous Ninth Circuit decision, League of 
Wilderness v. Forsgren reflects the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 
2002). At issue in Forsgren was whether aerially-administered pest control constituted a 
point source. Id. at 1184–85. Applying a categorical understanding of silvicultural dis-
charges, the EPA and U.S. Forest Service (USFS) argued the enumeration of pest control 
in the Silvicultural Rule exempted it from designation as a point source discharge. See id. at 
1185. Unconvinced, the court held that the EPA and USFS’s argument failed in light of the 
“clear and unambiguous” text of the statute
rce as “any discernible, conf
ying mechanisms attached to aircraft. Id. 
111 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1071. 
112 See id.; King, supra note 19, at 165 (“The [Brown] court established that natural 
mwater runoff ceases to be natural the moment it enters a conveyance system, and it is 
therefore beyond the scope of the Silvicultural Rule and a point source under the CWA.”). 
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sis on the manner of a pollutant’s conveyance and therefore invalid.113 In 
other words, a definition of point source that focuses on the type or 
character of the source of pollution is incongruent with the CWA’s pre-
scription that a point source constitutes any pollutant channeled or con-
tr ed though a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.”oll
, 
                                                                                                                     
114 
 Despite these comments, however, the Brown court shied from ex-
plicitly invalidating the 2011 Silvicultural Rule, instead offering an al-
ternative interpretation.115 The alternative interpretation, although not 
reflective of the EPA’s explicit intent, is consistent with the CWA.116 
Under this alternative reading, “the Rule exempts natural runoff from 
silvicultural activities such as those listed, but only as long as the ‘natu-
ral runoff’ remains natural.”117 This distinction between the two inter-
pretations is subtle and requires a clear understanding of the definition 
of point source discharge. Through the “discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance” standard, the CWA pinpoints the moment in which 
“natural” runoff is channeled or discharged through some man-made 
system of conveyance, and therein ceases to be “natural.”118 Thus, the 
alternative definition—which exempts runoff from silvicultural activi-
ties as long as it remains natural—adds nothing beyond what the CWA 
already provides in its definition of point source.119 The interpretation 
provides that discharges from nonpoint silvicultural sources are exempt
but those discharges from silvicultural point sources are not exempt.120 
 The Brown court also discussed the impact of the 1987 Stormwater 
Amendments on the Silvicultural Rule.121 The court held that neither 
 
113 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080. An interpretation of the 2011 Silvicultural Rule which “ex-
empts all natural runoff from [listed] silvicultural activities . . . irrespective of whether, and 
the manner in which, the runoff is collected, channeled, and discharged into protected 
water . . . is inconsistent with § 502(14) [of the CWA] and is, to that extent, invalid.” Id. 
114 See id. at 1079–80; King, supra note 19, at 168–69. 
115 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; King, supra note 19, at 167 (“The [Brown] court hesi-
tated to invalidate completely the Silvicultural Rule under Chevron, instead offering an 
interpretation of the rule not raised by the defendants in which naturally occurring runoff 
was exempt from permitting requirements if the runoff remained ‘natural,’ that is, either 
uncontrolled or [un]channeled in any systematic way.”). 
116 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080. 
117 See id. 
118 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080 (holding that the dis-
charge of natural runoff became point source when it was controlled through a “discerni-
ble, confined and discrete conveyance”). 
119 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (basing NPDES permitting requirements on point source 
characterization of the discharges), with Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080 (offering an interpreta-
tion of the Silvicultural Rule similarly contingent on point source characterizations). 
120 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080. 
121 Id. at 1081. 
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the 1987 Stormwater Amendments nor the stormwater regulations ex-
empted discharges from a “system of ditches, culverts, and channels” 
from the definition of point source discharges.122 As previously men-
tioned, the stormwater regulations partly intended to exempt certain 
nonpoint sources as defined in the Silvicultural Rule.123 The court, 
however, found these regulations to be at odds with the 1987 Stormwa-
ter Amendments;124 specifically, section 402(p), which requires the EPA 
to establish a permit application process for “discharges associated with 
industrial activity.”125 Because the runoff in dispute constituted a point 
source discharge of stormwater associated with an industrial activity, the 
court found that the discharges required NPDES permits.126 Therefore, 
the court held that the “1987 amendments to the CWA do not exempt 
from the NPDES permitting process stormwater runoff from logging 
oad
endments to the CWA nor the stormwater regulations 
                                                                                                                     
r s that is collected in a system of ditches, culverts, and channels, 
and is then discharged into streams and rivers.”127 
 In sum, the Ninth Circuit refrained from explicitly invalidating the 
2011 Silvicultural Rule, instead offering an alternative, narrower read-
ing of the Rule.128 Additionally, the court held that neither the 1987 
Stormwater Am
exempted the discharges at issue from the definition of point source 
discharges.129 
 
122 Id. at 1085. Additionally, the court held that in adopting the 1987 Amendments to 
the CWA, Congress did not sub silentio approve of, or acquiesce to, the Silvicultural rule. Id. 
at 1081. 
123 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations 
for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 48,011 (Nov. 16, 1990); see Brown, 640 
F.3d at 1083. 
124 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1085. 
125 Id. at 1083, 1085; see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (2006). In its determination that log-
ging constituted an “industrial activity,” the Brown court referenced the Standard Industrial 
Classifications (SIC) regulation, which unambiguously defines logging as an industrial activ-
ity. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1083–84 (discussing the designation of logging as an industrial activity 
under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Standard Industrial Classifica-
tions Manual). The SIC Manual defines logging as “[e]stablishments primarily engaged in 
cutting timber and in producing . . . primary forest or wood raw materials.” Standard Indus-
trial Classifications Manual, Industry Group 241: Logging, Occupational Safety & Health 
Admin., http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.display?id=538&tab=description (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2013). The relevant regulations also provide that the term “stormwater dis-
charge” includes those discharges from roads “used or traveled by carriers of raw materials, 
manufactured products, waste material, [etc.]” 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2011). 
126 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1085. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 1080. 
129 Id. at 1085. 
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 On September 13, 2011, Doug Decker, the current Oregon State 
Forrester, submitted a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.130 The petition urges the Court to find that the Ninth Circuit 
erred in Brown when it held that stormwater from logging is subject to 
the CWA’s NPDES permitting system.131 On November 30, 2012, the 
Friday before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Decker, the 
EPA issued a final rule—the “2012 clarification” —once again preclud-
ing stormwater discharges from logging roads from the NPDES sys-
tem.132 During the notice and comment period, many parties urged the 
EPA to wait to finalize the rule until the Supreme Court issued an opin-
ion in Decker.133 Nevertheless, the EPA explained that “[b]y moving to 
finalize this rule expeditiously, the EPA is providing the regulatory cer-
tainty needed in the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s decision and is reaf-
rm
the NPDES system.137 Recognizing the effect of the new regulations on 
                                                                                                                     
fi ing the EPA’s long-standing regulatory position regarding the ap-
plicability of stormwater regulations to logging roads.”134 
 The 2012 clarification, however, does not change the substance of 
the 2011 Silvicultural Rule as considered in Brown.135 Rather, the EPA’s 
intent behind this new regulation is to “clarify[y], contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in NEDC, that discharges of stormwater from Silvicul-
ture facilities other than [rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, 
and log storage] do not require a NPDES permit.”136 As the EPA itself 
notes, “[t]his revision does not remove any existing exemptions” from 
 
130 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., No. 11-338 (U.S. 
filed Sept. 13, 2011) (to access the docket for this case, visit Decker v. Northwest Environmental 
Defense Center, ScotusBlog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/decker-v-northwest-
environmental-defense-center/ (last visited, Jan. 21, 2013)). On June 25, 2012, the Court 
granted certiorari to hear an appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision and consolidated the 
appeals of two petitioners into Decker v. Northwest. Environmental Defense Center. Opinion at 1, 
Decker, No. 11-388, 133 S. Ct. 22, 22 (filed June 25, 2012); Opinion at 1, Decker, No. 11-347, 
133 S. Ct. 23, 23 (filed June 25, 2012). 
131 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 130, at ii–iii. 
132 Revisions to Stormwater Regulations to Clarify That an NPDES Permit Is Not Re-
quired for Stormwater Discharges from Logging Roads, 70 Fed. Reg. 72,970, 72,974 (Dec. 
7, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii)) [hereinafter 2012 Final Rule]; 
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, supra note 130. The rule includes as storm 
water discharges “[f]acilities classified within Standard Industrial Classification 24, Indus-
try Group 241 that are rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facilities 
operation in connection with silvicultural activities defined in 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(2)–
(3).” 2012 Final Rule, supra, at 72,974. 
133 2012 Final Rule, supra note 132, at 72,973. 
134 Id. 
135 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1078; 2012 Final Rule, supra note 132, at 72,973. 
136 2012 Final Rule, supra note 132, at 72,970. 
137 See id. at 72,973. 
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their determination of the Silvicultural Rule, on January 8, 2013, the 
Court granted petitioner’s motion to file supplemental briefs address-
ing the impact the of EPA’s 2012 clarification.138 
 undercut existing state Best Management 
excludes “agricultural stormwater discharges” from the definition of 
                                                                                                                     
C. Petition for Certiorari and Amicus Curiae Brief of the States of Arkansas, et. al. 
 Soon after the submission of the Oregon State Forrester’s petition 
for writ of certiorari, twenty-six states filed a joint amicus curiae brief to 
the Supreme Court, urging the Court to overturn the Ninth Circuit’s 
effective invalidation of the 2011 Silvicultural Rule in Brown.139 In Sep-
tember 2012, the States submitted a slightly modified amicus brief.140 
Both briefs set forth three main arguments for review of the Brown de-
cision.141 First, the States argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision that an 
EPA rule can be invalidated in a citizen suit is incorrect as a matter of 
law.142 This argument is beyond the scope of this Note, which assesses 
the validity and affects of the different iterations of the Silvicultural 
Rule. Second, the States argue that “[t]he Ninth Circuit failed to defer 
to EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the [CWA].”143 Third, according 
to the States, the decision will
Practice (BMP) programs.144 
 The States contend that “[t]he Ninth Circuit failed to defer to the 
EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the [CWA].”145 According to the 
States, the EPA’s exclusion of silvicultural discharges from the NPDES 
system is consistent with the CWA’s mandate that the EPA “create and 
manage a uniform system of interstate water pollution regulation.”146 
The States contend that the EPA’s exclusion of silvicultural discharges 
from NPDES permitting is consistent with this mandate because of the 
connection between silviculture and agriculture.147 The CWA explicitly 
 
138 Order in Pending Cases at 1, Decker, Nos. 11-338, 11-347 (U.S. filed Jan. 8, 2013). 
139 Amicus Curiae Brief of the States of Arkansas, et al., in Support of the Petitioners at 
5, Decker, Nos. 11-338, 11-347 (U.S. filed Oct. 14, 2011). 
140 Amicus Curiae Brief of the States of Arkansas, et al., in Support of the Petitioners, 
Decker, Nos. 11-338, 11-347 (U.S. filed Sept. 4, 2012) [hereinafter States’ Amicus Brief 
2012]. Because the States’ brief represents the unified position of twenty-six states’ attor-
neys general, this Note discusses their brief, rather than that of petitioner. 
141 Id. at 4, 7, 15. 
142 Id. at 4–7. 
143 Id. at 7–12. 
144 Id. at 15–19. 
145 Id. at 7. 
146 States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 7–9. (quoting Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 
503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992)). 
147 Id. at 9. 
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point sources.148 Thus, the States urge that silviculture—which they de-
fine as “the growing and harvesting of trees” —is connected to agricul-
tural practices and therefore is not a point source activity governed by 
NPDES.149 
 Next, the States argue the Ninth Circuit’s decision will adversely 
affect existing state BMP programs.150 They emphasize that Congress 
intended the regulation of potential water pollution from nonpoint 
sources to occur at the state level.151 According to the States, section 
1329 of the CWA reflects Congress’ understanding that the regulation 
of “forestry activities must be adapted to local conditions and circum-
stances,” and therein regulated at the state level rather than through 
NPDES.152 The States argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision under-
cuts and jeopardizes these purportedly successful state-level BMP pro-
grams.153 
III. The Invalidity of the Silvicultural Rule 
 The 2011 Silvicultural Rule (or “Rule”), as clarified in 2012 (the 
“2012 clarification”), is incompatible with the plain language of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA).154 Moreover, the EPA’s past iterations of the 
Rule have diluted the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
(NPDES) and allowed timber companies to evade NPDES require-
ments for decades.155 To remedy this, the court in Northwest Environ-
mental Defense Center v. Brown should have explicitly invalidated the 2011 
Silvicultural Rule just as Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle invali-
dated the Rule’s previous iteration.156 Both iterations are fundamen-
                                                                                                                      
 
148 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). 
149 See id. § 1362(12); States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 9. The States do not 
explicate their reasoning for why silviculture is an agricultural practice, nor do they cite 
any legal authority for this proposition. See States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 9. 
150 See States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 15. The CWA outlines the require-
ments of BMP programs for nonpoint source pollution in section 319. 33 U.S.C. § 1329. 
151 States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 15–16. 
152 See 33 U.S.C. § 1329; States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 15–16. 
153 Id. at 18, 19 (“BMPs have become an accepted, well-understood, documented, ap-
proved and successful method of protecting water quality in the United States and, in par-
ticular, in the nation’s forests.”). According to the Brief, “[i]f the Ninth Circuit decision in 
this case is not reversed by this Court, the states’ established BMP programs will be vacated 
in favor of NPDES permits, and the burden of NPDES permitting is substantial.” Id. at 19. 
154 See infra notes 157–224 and accompanying text. 
155 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 124.85 (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 (1975); 
King, supra note 19, at 169. 
156 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1080 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpreting the 
2011 Silvicultural Rule narrowly instead of explicitly invalidating it); Natural Res. Def. 
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tally flawed because they wrongly differentiate between point and non-
point sources by the type of activity involved rather than by the manner 
of conveyance.157 
                                                                                                                     
 Additionally, the arguments contained in the States’ amicus brief 
arguing for the reversal of Brown are unavailing because the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision does too little, rather than too much, to invalidate the 
2011 Silvicultural Rule.158 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s refrain from ex-
plicitly invalidating the Rule, however, the decision does significantly 
narrow its impact.159 As such, if upheld by the Supreme Court Brown will 
subject stormwater discharges conveyed by logging roads to NPDES, 
force entities engaging in logging to take significant measures to comply 
with NPDES requirements, and put an end to forty years of evading 
NPDES permits.160 Despite the heavy administrative burden this places 
on the EPA, because the EPA will be able to address the most significant 
sources of pollution first, the environmental benefits of this change 
stand to be immense.161 During this term, the Supreme Court should 
explicitly invalidate the Silvicultural Rule as incompatible with the plain 
language of the CWA.162 Moreover, because the 2012 clarification fails to 
alter the substance of the Silvicultural Rule, EPA’s last minute rule 
promulgation should not affect the Court’s decision.163 
A. Brown and the Silvicultural Rule’s Incompatibility with the CWA 
 The issue of whether the Silvicultural Rule is compatible with the 
CWA is a matter of statutory interpretation. As such, the framework set 
out in Chevron controls.164 The EPA’s Silvicultural Rule—including the 
 
Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invalidating the first iteration of 
the Silvicultural Rule). 
157 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 124.85 (1976). 
158 See infra notes 177–191 and accompanying text. 
159 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; King, supra note 19, at 169. 
160 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). In order to comply with the CWA, stormwater dis-
charges must meet the applicable requirements under §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 
and 1343. Id. As such, entities responsible for the discharges will have to follow stringent 
effluent limitations and national standards of performance, and will be subject to record 
keeping, reporting, and inspection. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1343; 
Brown, 640 F.3d at 1087. 
161 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p); U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4, at 4. 
162 See infra notes 157–264 and accompanying text. 
163 Supra notes 193–198 and accompanying text. 
164 See 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Con-
tinuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1123 (2008) (“Chevron is appropriately applied when the 
agency interpretation has been made pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking 
authority.”). 
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EPA’s newest clarifications—does not survive Chevron’s two-step inquiry 
and is therefore incompatible with the CWA.165 Three statutory provi-
sions inform an analysis of the Silvicultural Rule with regard to step one 
of the Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. inquiry: 
section 301’s prohibition on water pollution, section 502(14)’s defini-
tion of “point source” discharges, and section 402’s exception for agri-
cultural runoff.166 
 The combined effect of sections 301, 402, and 502 is clear and un-
ambiguous: the discharge of any pollutant from a point source into the 
nation’s waters without a NPDES permit is unlawful under the CWA, 
unless the discharge comes from an agricultural point source.167 The 
statute provides no NPDES exception for silvicultural sources.168 Con-
gress’ singular, explicit exclusion of agricultural discharges from the 
definition of point source reinforces the notion that the CWA carves 
out no specific exception for silvicultural discharges.169 
 Nevertheless, the CWA allows the EPA to promulgate rules and 
regulations consistent with the statute.170 In allowing the EPA to prom-
ulgate such rules, Congress authorizes the EPA to fill in gaps in the 
statute.171 In this respect, the EPA’s role is to supplement the CWA by 
“elucidat[ing] a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”172 The 
2011 Silvicultural Rule, however, neither elucidates an ambiguity nor 
fills in any gap in the CWA.173 Rather, the 2011 Silvicultural Rule adds 
an exemption to the definition of point source—and NPDES—not au-
thorized by Congress.174 
 Even if the CWA were ambiguous or silent on the issue, the EPA’s 
interpretation of sections 301, 402, and 502 is unreasonable and there-
fore invalid.175 A juxtaposition of the 2011 Silvicultural Rule with the 
                                                                                                                      
 
165 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1362(14); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.26(b)(14)(ii) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2011). 
166 See Clean Water Act, §§ 301, 402, 502(14), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1362(14) 
(2006). 
167 See id.; Brown, 640 F.3d at 1070. 
168 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
169 See id. (“[The term point source] does not include agricultural stormwater dis-
charges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”). 
170 See id. § 1361. 
171 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
172 See id. at 843–44. 
173 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2011). 
174 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080. Compare 33. U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006) (providing a 
NPDES permitting exception for agricultural discharges), with 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (provid-
ing a NPDES permitting exception for certain silvicultural discharges). 
175 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 483 (establishing that an agency’s unreasonable interpreta-
tion of its implementing state will be invalidated); Costle, 568 F.2d at 1377 (“[T]he EPA 
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definition of point source discharge demonstrates this incompatibility. 
In relevant part, the Rule provides that only those silvicultural dis-
charges from “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance re-
lated to rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facili-
ties which are operated in connection with silvicultural activities” are 
point sources.176 As such, the Silvicultural Rule uses a categorical ap-
proach that distinguishes between silvicultural discharges that classify as 
point source discharges and those that do not.177 The Rule’s categorical 
approach, distinguishing between discharges based on the type of activ-
ity from which the discharges are rendered, is entirely at odds with the 
CWA.178 The CWA’s definition of point source contains no discussion 
of the types of polluting activities.179 Instead, the CWA distinguishes 
between point source and nonpoint source discharges by the manner in 
which the pollutant is conveyed.180 Pursuant to the CWA, a discharge is 
point source in nature if it is channeled through some “discernible, 
confined discrete conveyance,” regardless of the activity with which the 
discharge is associated.181 Thus, the Silvicultural Rule’s categorical ap-
proach to defining point source discharges disregards the CWA’s crite-
ria and is therefore unreasonable.182 
 Despite the fact that the Rule should not survive Chevron analysis, 
the Ninth Circuit refrained from explicitly invalidating the 2011 
Rule.183 As even the States’ amicus brief notes, Brown disguises its “rule 
invalidation as an alternate interpretation.”184 Instead of actually in-
validating the Rule, the court narrowly held that “stormwater runoff 
from logging roads that is collected by and then discharged from a sys-
                                                                                                                      
administrator does not have authority to exempt categories of point sources from the 
permit requirements of § 402. Courts may not manufacture for an agency a revisory power 
inconsistent with the clear intent of the relevant statute.”); 40 CF.R. § 122.27 (exempting 
certain silvicultural point sources from NPDES). 
176 40 C.F.R. § 122.27. 
177 See id. 
178 See id.; Brown, 640 F.3d at 1078, 1080. EPA’s newest regulations contain the same 
flaw. See 40 CF.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii) (2012). In seeking to “clarify” the status of stormwa-
ter discharges, the regulation merely replicates this categorical approach, once again ex-
empting all discharges that do not originate from “rock crushing, gravel washing, log sort-
ing, and log storage” from NPDES. Id. 
179 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
180 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1078. 
181 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
182 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 483; Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) 
(2012); 40 CF.R. § 122.27 (2011); see also Costle, 568 F.2d at 1377 (invalidating the previous, 
similar iteration of the Silvicultural Rule). 
183 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 482–83; Brown, 640 F.3d at 1087. 
184 States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 12. 
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tem of ditches, culverts, and channels is a point source discharge for 
which an NPDES permit is required.”185 By not explicitly invalidating 
the Rule, and rather offering an alternative unintended reading of the 
regulation, the Ninth Circuit left the future of the Silvicultural Rule 
unclear.186 Such uncertainty creates future confusion as to the regula-
tion of stormwater runoff at the federal level.187 The Ninth Circuit 
should have explicitly invalidated the Rule, just as the D.C. Circuit did 
with the Rule’s previous iteration.188 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite this failure to invalidate the 2011 Silvicultural Rule, the 
Ninth Circuit found that to the extent that the Rule distinguished point 
source discharges from nonpoint discharges by categories of human 
activity, the Rule was inconsistent with the CWA.189 The court con-
spicuously refrained from explicitly invalidating the Rule, offering an 
alternate interpretation of the Rule.190 Under this interpretation, the 
2011 Silvicultural Rule only exempts polluted stormwater runoff from 
the types of activities mentioned if the runoff is not channeled through 
a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.”191 Not only is the 
court’s reading not intended by the EPA, but it adds nothing beyond 
what the CWA already provides: NPDES permits apply to point sources, 
but do not apply to nonpoint sources.192 
  Moreover, EPA’s latest regulations are similarly inconsistent with 
the CWA.193 The 2012 clarification—which the EPA allegedly propa-
gated to provide “regulatory certainty” —do nothing but muddy the 
water.194 The regulation merely reinforces the substance of the 2011 
 
 
185 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1087. 
186 See King, supra note 19. 
187 See id. 
188 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; Costle, 568 F.2d at 1377. 
189 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080. 
190 Id.; see King, supra note 19, at 167 (noting that the Ninth Circuit offers an interpre-
tation of the rule “not raised by the defendants”). 
191 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080. 
192 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1362(14) (2006); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,932, 56,935 (Dec. 5, 1975). As evidenced by 
previous EPA regulations regarding silvicultural discharges, EPA considered most silvucul-
tural runoff to be non-point and therein exempt from NPDES. Id. 
193 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 483; Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; 2012 Final Rule, supra note 
132, at 72,973; see also Costle, 568 F.2d at 1377 (invalidating the previous, similar iteration of 
the Silvicultural Rule). 
194 See 2012 Final Rule, supra note 132, at 72,973 (asserting that the new regulations pro-
vide for certainty in the wake of Brown); Robert Barnes, Last-Minute EPA Rule Change Frustrates 
Chief Justice, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 2012, at A3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/last-minute-epa-rule-change-frustrates-chief-justice/2012/12/03/cc3d9c2a-3d8b-
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Silvicultural Rule.195 According to the Rule, discharges that result from 
processes other than rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, and log 
storage do not require NPDES permits.196 As such the 2012 clarification 
to the 2011 Silvicultural Rule is fundamentally flawed.197 Like the 2011 
Rule, the 2012 clarification bases the applicability of NPDES on the 
type of activity that renders a given discharge rather than on whether 
the discharge is point source in nature, as required by the plain lan-
guage of the CWA.198 Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s determination 
in Decker should not be influenced by the EPA’s latest regulations be-
cause they do not alter the substance of the Silvicultural Rule and fail to 
conform to the CWA.199 
 In summary, the Ninth Circuit refrained from invalidating the 
2011 Silvicultural Rule, and instead offered an interpretation of the 
Rule that severely limits its applicability, contrary to the EPA’s intent.200 
The court should have explicitly invalidated the Silvicultural Rule using 
the reasoning employed by the D.C. Circuit in Costle.201 The Costle court 
invalidated the earlier iteration of the Silvicultural Rule because it cate-
gorically exempted entire classes of point sources from NPDES.202 Ad-
                                                                                                                      
 
11e2-ae43-cf491b837f7b_story.html (noting the complications resulting from EPA’s last min-
ute rulemaking). 
195 Compare 40 CF.R. § 122.27 (2011) (providing that discharges resulting from certain 
silvicultural activities are exempt from NPDES), with 2012 Final Rule, supra note 132, at 
72,973 (clarifying that discharges resulting from activities other than rock crushing, gravel 
washing, log sorting, and log storage are exempt from NPDES). 
196 2012 Final Rule, supra note 132, at 72,973. 
197 See id.; Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080 (holding that an interpretation of the 2011 Silvicul-
tural Rule which “exempts all natural runoff from [listed] silvicultural activities . . . irre-
spective of whether, and the manner in which, the runoff is collected, channeled, and 
discharged into protected water . . . is inconsistent with § 502(14) [of the CWA] and is, to 
that extent, invalid.”). 
198 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1078. Compare 40 CF.R. § 122.27 
(providing that discharges resulting from certain silvicultural activities are exempt from 
NPDES), with 2012 Final Rule, supra note 132, at 72,973 (clarifying that discharges result-
ing from activities other than rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, and log storage 
are exempt from NPDES). 
199 See supra notes 193–198 and accompanying text. 
200 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; 40 Fed. Reg. 56,932, 56,935 (Dec. 5, 1975) (demonstrat-
ing the EPA’s intent to treat silvicultural discharges as non-point sources rather than point 
sources). 
201 See Costle, 568 F.2d at 1377 (invalidating the original Silvicultural Rule because it 
employed a categorical approach to differentiating between point and nonpoint sources of 
pollution); see also King, supra note 19, at 168 (stating that the same logic from Costle, “in-
validation from overreach,” applies to the most recent iteration of the Silvicultural Rule). 
202 Costle, 568 F.2d at 1375, 1377 (“Under the EPA’s interpretation the Administrator 
would have broad discretion to exempt large classes of point sources from any or all re-
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ditionally, the Costle court held that the EPA lacked the authority to ex-
empt point source discharging pollutants from regulation under 
NPDES.203 The 2011 Silvicultural Rule, as clarified in 2012, contains the 
same fatal flaws as the rule considered in Costle and is thus inconsistent 
with the CWA.204 
 Recognizing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision drastically narrows 
the applicability of the Silvicultural Rule, the States’ amicus brief asks 
the Supreme Court to overturn the decision.205 The States’ arguments, 
however, are unavailing—indeed, the Brown decision does too little, 
rather than too much, to invalidate the Silvicultural Rule.206 
 The States’ primary argument is that the CWA allows for an ex-
emption for silvicultural activities.207 Recognizing that Congress ex-
empted agricultural stormwater discharges from the definition of point 
source, the States assert that silviculture is connected to agricultural 
practices and therefore properly precluded from the NDPES system.208 
Therefore, the States argue that the EPA’s exemption for silvicultural 
activities is a reasonable interpretation of the CWA.209 The States’ ar-
gument necessarily depends, however, on its contention that silvicul-
ture is an agricultural activity.210 Citing no legal authority for this 
proposition, the states instead reference an obscure 1907 publication 
titled Practical Forestry.211 
 Although the States’ brief provides little support for the proposi-
tion that the term “agriculture” encompasses “silviculture,” certain sec-
tions of the CWA employ similar regimes for the regulation of silvicul-
tural and agricultural discharges.212 For example, in section 1344, 
Permits for Dredged or Fill Material, Congress provides the following 
discharges as non-prohibited: “[N]ormal farming, silviculture, and 
                                                                                                                      
quirements of the [Federal Water Pollution Control Act]. This is a result that the legisla-
tors did not intend.”). 
203 Id. at 1377. 
204 See Costle, 568 F.2d at 1375; 2012 Final Rule, supra note 132, at 72,973; 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.27 (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 124.85 (1976). 
205 States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 3–4. 
206 See King, supra note 19, at 169 (noting that there is some ambiguity as to whether 
Brown left open a “slim window” for the application of the Silvicultural Rule). 
207 See States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 7–9. 
208 Id. at 7, 9 (citing John Gifford, Practical Forestry 12 (1907)). 
209 Id. 
210 See id. at 9 (“Both historically and academically, silviculture—the growing and har-
vesting of trees—is a recognized agricultural practice.”). 
211 Id. (citing Gifford, supra note 208). 
212 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(b)(2)(F), 1344 (2006); States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 
140, at 9. 
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ranching activities, such as plowing, seeding, [and] cultivating . . . .”213 
Similarly, section 1288 associates the terms “silviculture” and “agricul-
ture,” to a degree.214 Section 1288 refers to the creation of a process to 
identify “agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources of 
pollution” and sets forth measures to control such sources.215 Although 
these excerpts do not explicitly provide that the CWA’s use of the term 
agriculture includes silvicultural activities, they do indicate that the 
CWA regulates these activities in a similar manner in certain areas.216 
Nevertheless, nowhere in the CWA does the term agriculture encapsu-
late silviculture.217 Rather, the CWA treats these terms as conceptually 
distinct, outlining different rights and obligations for each, even if 
those obligations sometimes overlap.218 As such, the term “agriculture” 
does not encompass “silviculture” and the CWA contains no support for 
silvicultural exemptions to NDPES.219 
 Conspicuously, however, the States’ brief refrains from comparing 
the effects of the 2011 Silvicultural Rule to the plain language of 
NPDES.220 Instead, the States devote much of their argument to ex-
plaining how the 2011 Silvicultural Rule is consistent with longstanding 
EPA practice.221 That the EPA’s exception for silvicultural discharges 
from NPDES is a longstanding practice, however, is not in dispute. 
Moreover, the EPA’s repeated failure to submit silvicultural discharges to 
NPDES requirements does not make the Rule consistent with the plain 
language or purpose of the CWA.222 
                                                                                                                      
213 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A). 
214 Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F). 
215 Id. 
216 See id. §§ 1288(b)(2)(F), 1344(f)(1)(A). 
217 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357. 
218 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329, 1342 (2006); cf. Lovgren v. Locke, 701 F.3d 5, 29 (1st Cir. 
2012) (concluding the statute at issue did not include one type of fishing program when 
Congress was aware of that program when it enacted the statute and included other 
named programs in the statutory provision at the exclusion of others). In section 1342 
(NPDES), for example, there is no association between agriculture and silviculture. 33 
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agricultural runoff and refrains from mentioning silvicultural runoff. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329, 
1342 (2006). Moreover, the Standard Industrial Classifications manual unambiguously 
provides that logging and other silvicultural activities constitute “industrial activities.” See 
Brown, 640 F.3d at 1083–84, Standard Industrial Classifications Manual: Industry Group 241: 
Logging, supra note 125. 
219 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1362(14); Standard Industrial Classifications Manual: Industry 
Group 241: Logging, supra note 125. 
220 See States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140. 
221 See id. at 7–12. 
222 See supra notes 148–213 and accompanying text. 
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 Second, the States’ argument that an invalidation of the 2011 Silvi-
cultural Rule would adversely affect existing state Best Management 
Practice (BMP) fails to recognize that Congress explicitly provides that 
BMP programs apply only to nonpoint sources of pollution.223 The 
CWA takes a dichotomous approach to the regulation of water pollu-
tion: NPDES permitting, at the federal level, for point sources and 
BMP, at the state level, for nonpoint sources.224 Because silvicultural 
activities yield both point source and nonpoint source runoff, the regu-
lation of such discharges necessarily involves two separate legislative 
and regulatory schemes.225 Therefore, an invalidation of the 2011 Silvi-
cultural Rule should not affect BMP programs.226 BMP programs will 
continue to serve their congressionally intended role with respect to 
silvicultural discharges; they will regulate nonpoint silvicultural dis-
charges, as explicitly provided by the CWA.227 
 In sum, the States’ arguments are unavailing. Pursuant to the un-
ambiguous language of the CWA, the 2011 Silvicultural Rule is expressly 
invalid.228 Moreover, because the BMP programs apply only to nonpoint 
source pollution, an invalidation of the Rule should have no impact on 
the success of these programs.229 
B. Undoing Decades of NPDES Evasion 
 Runoff from silvicultural activities poses a significant threat to wa-
ter quality.230 The Silvicultural Rule’s exemption for certain silvicultural 
point sources has allowed significant sources of water pollution to 
evade NPDES requirements, the CWA’s primary check on water pollu-
tion.231 In defense of this rule, the EPA has continuously maintained 
that the pollution problems by silvicultural discharges are minor in re-
                                                                                                                      
223 See 33 U.S.C. § 1329; States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 15–19. The States 
root this argument in the contention that environmental protection of forestlands must be 
adapted to the unique circumstances and conditions of particular states. States’ Amicus 
Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 15–16. 
224 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329, 1342 (2006). 
225 See id. Runoff from silviculturally-related activities may either be channeled through 
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unimpeded fashion. See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1071. 
226 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329, 1342; Brown, 640 F.3d at 1071. 
227 See 33 U.S.C. § 1329. 
228 See supra notes 157–216 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 217–221 and accompanying text. 
230 Brown & Binkley, supra note 17; U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4, at 4; Binkley & 
Brown, supra note 10. 
231 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 124.85 (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 (1975); 
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224 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:197 
lation to the administrative burden in processing application forms for 
these sources.232 Moreover, at least initially, it did not appear that the 
EPA contemplated any alternative methods to enforcing effluent limita-
tions in the absence of a NPDES permit.233 The EPA has consistently 
attempted to avoid its responsibility in the regulation of silvicultural 
point sources, without developing practicable alternatives.234 
 Since its promulgation of the first iteration of the Silvicultural 
Rule, the EPA has maintained that the Rule intends to separate those 
discharges well-qualified for control under NPDES from those that are 
not.235 Through its definition of point source in section 502(14), how-
ever, the CWA already makes this distinction.236 Indeed, the “discerni-
ble, confined and discrete conveyance” standard in section 502(14) 
serves to identify those “candidates suitable to control-at-the-source.”237 
Thus, through the 2011 Silvicultural Rule and the 2012 clarification, 
the EPA redundantly tries to identify sources that are suitable for 
NPDES permitting within the class of sources the CWA has already 
identified as requiring NPDES permits.238 
 Admittedly, there is some merit to the EPA’s contention that certain 
silvicultural activities that yield discharges are more compatible with 
NPDES permitting than others—in part, due to the instrumentalities 
involved in channeling discharges in each activity.239 In his article, Restor-
ing the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, David Drelich provides a useful 
distinction.240 Drelich explains that the most typical point sources used 
                                                                                                                      
232 Form and Guidelines Regarding Agricultural and Silvicultural Activities, 38 Fed. 
Reg. 18,000, 18000 ( July 5, 1973) (“The expenditure in time, dollars, and resources neces-
sary to process applications from every small farmer subject to NPDES requirements would 
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233 Gaba, supra note 37, at 420 n.62. 
234 King, supra note 19, at 170 (“Almost forty years after the passage of the CWA, the 
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235 Form and Guidelines Regarding Agricultural and Silvicultural Activities, 38 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,000; National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System and State Program Ele-
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note 37, at 420–21. 
236 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006); see Drelich, supra note 15, at 312. 
237 See Drelich, supra note 15, at 312. 
238 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); 40 C.F.R. § 122(b)(14)(2012); 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2011). 
239 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,932, 56,933 
(Dec. 5, 1975) (“[M]any sources of pollution within these previously excluded categories 
are not susceptible to regulation by effluent limitations . . . .”); Brown & Binkley, supra 
note 17, at 1 (noting that it is difficult to track the specific silvicultural activity that caused 
the environmental degradation). 
240 Drelich, supra note 15. 
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in the discharge of water pollutants are “active instrumentalities,” such 
as pipes, hoses, and sprayers.241 Conversely, “passive” instrumentalities, 
including “culverts, drainage ditches, [and] storm water collection sys-
tems,” are less identifiable sources of water pollution.242 These passive 
instrumentalities are often used in silvicultural activities, like the collec-
tion devices at issue in Brown.243 Passive instrumentalities are more diffi-
cult to regulate through NPDES—or any other regulatory system—than 
are instrumentalities that actually generate pollutants.244 In this respect, 
the EPA’s exemption of activities which utilize passive instrumentalities 
reflects an attempt to identify only the activities most conducive to regu-
lation.245 
 Nevertheless, these instrumentalities are still subject to NPDES in-
sofar as they channel and convey pollutants through a “discernible, con-
fined and discrete conveyance.”246 Therefore, regardless of whether 
stormwater collection systems are difficult to regulate, or less conducive 
to the NPDES permitting system than other point sources, they are still 
point sources subject to NPDES requirements.247 Moreover, through the 
1987 Stormwater Amendments, Congress already lessened the EPA’s 
administrative burden by prioritizing point source pollution through its 
phased-and-tiered approach to stormwater control.248 Through the 2011 
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Indians, 16 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 25 (2004) (“Neither EPA nor a state has the au-
thority to exempt from the section 402 NPDES permit requirement discharges otherwise 
subject to the requirements of sections 301(a) and 402 of the Act.”). 
248 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1082 (“Congress recognized that EPA’s 
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the definition of a point source. In § 402(p), adopted as part of the 1987 amendments, 
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Silvicultural Rule and the 2012 clarification, the EPA diminishes the 
class of discharges subject to NPDES.249 In doing so, the Silvicultural 
Rule dilutes the CWA and lessens the force of NPDES, the central 
means of enforcing the CWA’s prohibition on water pollution.250 
 The Brown decision mitigates the negative effects of the 2011 Silvi-
cultural Rule.251 Even though the Brown court’s holding does not in-
validate the Silvicultural Rule, it significantly cabins the Rule to apply 
only to silvicultural runoff that flows from logging roads in a natural, 
unimpeded matter.252 The environmental impact of such a holding is 
substantial.253 Currently, there are hundreds of thousands of miles of 
logging roads covering millions of acres of forestland within the United 
States.254 Logging companies and associated entities construct these 
roads such that a system of ditches and channels conveys stormwater 
runoff and has drastic hydrological effects.255 The U.S. Forest Service 
(USFS) itself submits that construction and maintenance of forest 
roads have the greatest impact on water quality and wetlands of any sil-
vicultural activity.256 The Ninth Circuit’s significant narrowing of the 
2011 Silvicultural Rule in Brown subjects stormwater discharges con-
veyed by these logging roads to NPDES.257 Thus, entities engaged in 
logging or forest road construction will have to take significant meas-
ures to comply with NPDES requirements.258 
 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s refrain from explicitly invalidating 
the Rule, and instead offering of an alternate interpretation unin-
tended by the EPA, leaves the future of the Silvicultural Rule unclear.259 
                                                                                                                      
Congress required NPDES permits for the most significant sources of stormwater pollution 
under so-called ‘Phase 1’ regulations.”(internal citations omitted)). 
249 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 
(2011). 
250 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2012); Gaba, supra note 37, at 410. 
251 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1087; King, supra note 19, at 169. 
252 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080. 
253 U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4, at 4; King, supra note 19, at 169. 
254 John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. To Suspend Road Building in Many National Forest Areas, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1998, at A1. In 1998, there were “400,000 miles of roads in the ap-
proximately 50 million acres of national forest.” Id.; see King, supra note 19, at 169. 
255 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1067. 
256 U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4, at 4. In addition to forest road development, the 
USFS report also cites timber harvesting activities, mechanical site preparation, pesticide 
application and prescribed burning as major sources of water pollution. Id. If left intact, 
the Silvicultural Rule precludes discharges associated with these activities from regulation. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2011). 
257 640 F.3d at 1080. 
258 See King, supra note 19, at 169. 
259 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; King, supra note 19. 
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The Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in Decker, has the potential to 
clarify the uncertainty left by Brown by explicitly invalidating the 2011 
Silvicultural Rule as inconsistent with the plain language of the CWA.260 
An explicit invalidation of the Rule by the Ninth Circuit would have 
been consistent with the CWA and relevant case law invalidating previ-
ous, yet similar, iterations of the rule.261 The Court should thus take the 
opportunity to resolve whatever doubt the Brown court left as to the va-
lidity of the 2011 Silvicultural Rule as clarified in 2012.262 In doing so, 
the Supreme Court would unequivocally put an end to forty years of 
evading NPDES requirements. 
 If the Supreme Court invalidates the 2011 Silvicultural Rule there 
will be a significant rise in applications for NPDES permits.263 As such, 
the EPA will have to confront the administrative burden it has been try-
ing to avoid since its promulgation of the original Silvicultural Rule in 
1973.264 Whether or not the task of administering NPDES permits for 
all silvicultural point source discharges is feasible, the CWA requires the 
EPA to do so, and it is imperative that the EPA address these significant 
sources of water pollution.265 Given that the 1987 Stormwater Amend-
ments allow the EPA to address the most significant sources of stormwa-
ter pollution first, the EPA should be able to prioritize industrial pol-
luters and therein regulate discharges from silvicultural activities in an 
effective manner.266 Moreover, within these silviculture-related indus-
trial polluters, the EPA should address those NPDES permits relating to 
logging road construction and maintenance before issuing permits for 
discharges from lesser polluting activities such as mechanical site 
preparation, pesticide application, and prescribed burning.267 This will 
allow the EPA to deal with the vast increase in NPDES permits thought-
fully, with a focus on regulating the biggest threats to fresh water. Due 
to the EPA’s similar NPDES permitting process for stormwater dis-
charges for other types of roads, the EPA should be able to effectively 
                                                                                                                      
260 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; King, supra note 19. 
261 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (discussing the invalidation of the Sil-
vicultural Rule in Costle). 
262 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1080; King, supra note 19. 
263 See States’ Amicus Brief 2012, supra note 140, at 4 (stating that invalidation of Brown 
would lead to a substantial burden in NPDES permitting). 
264 Form and Guidelines Regarding Agricultural and Silvicultural Activities, 38 Fed. 
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establish permitting processes for discharges from logging roads.268 
The environmental benefits of this change could be immense.269 
Conclusion 
 The EPA’s various iterations of the Silvicultural Rule have diluted 
the impact of NPDES and allowed the U.S. Forest Service and timber 
companies to evade NPDES requirements for decades. Each iteration 
contains the same defect: they exempt classes of activities from NPDES 
even when they are channeled or controlled though a “discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance.” The Brown court should have ex-
plicitly invalidated the 2011 Silvicultural Rule just as the D.C. Circuit 
invalidated its previous iteration in Costle. Despite the Ninth Circuit’s 
refrain from explicitly invalidating the rule, however, the decision does 
significantly narrow its impact. If the Supreme Court upholds Brown, 
the Silvicultural Rule will subject stormwater discharges conveyed by 
logging roads to NPDES, and thus force entities engaging in logging to 
take significant measures to comply with the NPDES requirements they 
have been evading for decades. Nevertheless, the Court should take the 
opportunity to explicitly invalidate the 2011 Silvicultural Rule as incon-
sistent with the CWA. In its decision, the Supreme Court should not be 
influenced by the EPA’s latest regulations because they do not alter the 
substance of the Silvicultural Rule and fail to conform to the require-
ments of the CWA. Moreover, to manage the administrative difficultly 
in the surge of NPDES permit applications, the EPA should prioritize 
those industrial polluters engaging in logging road construction and 
maintenance. 
 
268 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1087 (noting that “given the closely analogous NPDES permit-
ting process for stormwater runoff from other kinds of roads,” the EPA will be able to ef-
fectively establish similar processes for stormwater runoff from logging roads). 
269 See U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 4, at 4 (describing the effects of water pollution 
from silvicultural activities). 
